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THE CONTINUOUS OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT:
A BAR TO MERITORIOUS SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS?
A shareholder derivative suit is an equitable action in which a plaintiff
shareholder seeks to compel a corporation to assert a corporate right of
action when corporate management wrongfully has refused to sue persons
who have harmed the corporation.' The purpose of a shareholder derivative
action is to provide a mechanism by which a shareholder may obtain relief
for a wrong to the corporation when the corporation is under the control of
the persons who have committed the wrong.2 A plaintiff shareholder, how-
1. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1821, at 294
(1982); 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF Tim LAW OF PRIVATE COiORATIONS § 5941.1, at 18-
19 (perm. ed. 1984); 3B J. MOORE, Moore's Federal Practice 23.1-47 (2d ed. 1985). In Hawes
v. City of Oakland, the United States Supreme Court established two prerequisites to the
institution of a shareholder derivative action. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61
(1881). The Court in Hawes stated that there must be a right of action existing for the
corporation to redress a wrong that has caused serious harm to the corporation. Id. at 460.
The Hawes Court stated that the wrongful act could be an action by corporate management
that exceeds the authority conferred on management by the corporate charter or a fraudulent
transaction involving management and third parties. Id. The Hawes Court also specified that a
wrong may result through the oppressive acts of majority shareholders acting in the name of
the corporation and violating the rights of other shareholders. Id. Under Hawes, a shareholder
bringing a derivative action must show that he has exhausted all avenues of redress within the
corporation before the shareholder may institute a suit that actually belongs to the corporation.
Id. at 461. The Supreme Court also stated that a plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he
was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his shares
devolved on him since the occurrence of the alleged wrong by "operation of law." Id.; see
infra note 85 (defining "operation of law"). Finally, Hawes required that a plaintiff aver that
the suit is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court otherwise not authorized to
maintain the action. Hawes, 104 U.S. at 461.
The Supreme Court's purpose in Hawes was to prevent corporations from creating
diversity jurisdiction by having a nonresident shareholder institute suit. Id. at 452-53. The
United States Supreme Court adopted Equity Rule 94, the forerunner to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1, in 1882 as a codification of its decision in Hawes. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra,
at § 1821. Equity Rule 27 replaced Equity Rule 94 in 1912. Id. In 1938, Equity Rule 27 became
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. In 1966, the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules determined that there should be a separate rule governing derivative actions
and, therefore, adopted federal rule 23.1 to set forth requirements governing derivative suits.
Id.; see infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (discussing standing requirements under rule
23.1).
2. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 5941.1, 19 (shareholders have right in equity to
compel assertion of corporate right when corporation wrongfully refuses to sue). A shareholder
derivative suit prevents a failure of justice when corporate managers refuse to prosecute an
action. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 319 (1936); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59
U.S. 331, 339 (1856). Generally, a corporation fails to assert a right of action because the
wrongdoers are those in control of the corporation. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d
Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 784 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982);
Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Say. & Loan Ass'n, 568 F. Supp. 1067, 1076
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ever, may not maintain a derivative action unless the plaintiff adequately
represents the interests of the other shareholders in enforcing the rights of
the corporation.3 Adequate representation requires that the plaintiff in a
derivative suit have interests consonant with the shareholders whom the
plaintiff purports to represent.4 To ensure that a plaintiff attempting to bring
a shareholder derivative action possesses the requisite interest to bring an
action on behalf of a corporation, a plaintiff must satisfy certain standing
requirements before the plaintiff may maintain a derivative action.'
(D.C. Va. 1983). However, if the failure of corporate management to bring an action represents
an honest business judgment, then a shareholder may not maintain a derivative action. See
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.C. Ill. 1983) (dismissing claim because
defendants demonstrated that decision not to pursue suit was result of thorough investigation
and good faith business judgment); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (D.C.N.Y.
1976) (court should not interfere with judgment of corporate officers to not institute lawsuit
absent allegation of fraud, dishonesty or other breach of trust or misconduct).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (describing standing requirements in shareholder derivative
suits). The United State Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., expressed the
rationale behind requiring that a plaintiff in a derivative action fairly and adequately represent
the interests of shareholders similarly situated. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
549 (1949). The Court explained that a stockholder who brings suit on behalf of the corporation
assumes a position of a fiduciary nature. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 549. The Cohen Court stated that
a plaintiff in a derivative action sues not for himself but as the representative of other
shareholders similarly situated. Id. The Court indicated that the adequate representation
requirement attempts to impose responsibility and accountability on a plaintiff in a derivative
action to ensure that he protects the interests of the other shareholders. Id. at 549-50.
4. See Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 706 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (interests of plaintiff
in derivative action should be consistent with those of shareholders that plaintiff purports to
represent); see also Blum v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 539 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1976)
(dismissing shareholder derivative action when plaintiff was unable to fairly represent other
shareholders because of personal litigation with corporation); G.A. Enter. Inc. v. Leisure Living
Communities, 517 F.2d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1975) (plaintiff could not assure adequate represen-
tation of shareholders similarly situated because of relationship between plaintiff's principal
and defendant). See generally FLE cmR, supra note 1, at § 5994, 266-68 (describing requirement
of adequate representation in shareholder derivative actions); WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 1,
at § 1833, 392 (discussing fair and adequate representation by plaintiff in derivative action).
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (defining prerequisites for maintenance of shareholder
derivative suit). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern proceedings in federal courts and
thus, federal courts require plaintiffs in derivative actions to comply with the standing require-
ments in federal rule 23.1. FL.Erca-R, supra note 1, at § 5981, 215. For a plaintiff in a derivative
action to satisfy the standing requirements in rule 23.1, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
owned stock in the corporation at the time of the transaction of which plaintiff complains or
that plaintiff's shares have since devolved upon plaintiff "by operation of law." FED. R. Civ.
P. 23.1.1. "By operation of law" suggests a transaction in which a plaintiff became a shareholder
through a nonconsensual transaction. WRIGHT & MuL., supra note 1, at § 1828, 348. For
example, "by operation of law" includes a bequest of stock by will. FLETcheR, supra note 1,
at § 5981, 217; see Perrott v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 953, 956 (D. Del. 1944) (legatee
permitted to maintain derivative action even though receipt of stock occurred after wrong of
which he complained). Additionally, courts have found that rule 23.1 contains an implied
requirement necessitating that the plaintiff maintain his status as a shareholder throughout the
litigation. FLETcHER, supra note 1, at § 5981, 217; see Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238
(5th Cir. 1983) (finding implied requirement of continuous ownership in rule 23.1); Issen v.
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While state law or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may govern the
standing requirements for a derivative action, federal standing requirements
generally do not differ from the standing requirements that the states impose
upon a plaintiff attempting to bring a derivative action. 6 Both state and
federal law usually impose a requirement of contemporaneous ownership,
which ensures that a plaintiff in a derivative action was a shareholder at the
time of the alleged wrong.7 State and federal law also generally impose a
requirement of continuous ownership, ensuring that the plaintiff maintains
shareholder status throughout the pendency of the derivative action.8 When
federal and state law differ with regard to the standing requirements in
shareholder derivative actions, however, the state law controls if the plaintiff
brings the action in state court. 9 If the plaintiff brings the derivative action
in federal court the doctrine that the United States Supreme Court enunciated
in Erie Railway Company v. Tomkins (Erie),'0 becomes relevant.," The Erie
GSC Enter., 538 F. Supp. 745, 752 (N.D. II. 1982) (interpreting rule 23.1 to contain continuous
ownership requirement); see infra note 6 (enumerating states following standing requirements
of rule 23.1).
6. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 48 (3d Cir. 1946) (law of
Kentucky is in substance identical to federal rule governing derivative actions); Hurt v. Cotton
States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1944) (whether court considers action in light
of federal rule or Georgia law, plaintiff must allege shareholder status at time of transaction of
which plaintiff complains or status thereafter by devolution of law); Lawson v, Baltimore Paint
& Chem. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D.C. Md. 1969) (law of Maryland governing standing
requirements in derivative actions is same as federal rule 23.1); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F.
Supp. 9, 12 (E.D. Mich. 1949) (federal rule and Michigan law impose same standing requirements
on plaintiff in derivative action); FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 5981, 215-23 (discussing standing
requirement in derivative actions under federal rule and state law); WRIGTr & MI.ER, supra
note 1, at § 1826, 325-30 (describing federal-state conflict in derivative actions); MooRE, supra
note 1, at 23.1-15 (discussing principles governing federal-state conflict in derivative actions);
infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text (discussing Erie doctrine and its application to derivative
suits).
7. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 5981, 217-26 (federal and state cases and statutes
enumerating standing requirements in derivative actions).
8. See supra note 6 (citing source in which to find federal and state cases and statutes
enumerating standing requirements in derivative actions).
9. See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text (discussing Erie doctrine in context of
federal-state conflict over standing requirements).
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11. Id. at 64; see MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-19 (explaining federal-state conflict
and applicability of Erie doctrine in context of shareholder derivative actions). The United
States Supreme Court promulgated the Erie doctrine in 1938 in Erie Railway Company v.
Tomkins. See Erie Railway Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (promulgating Erie doctrine).
The Erie doctrine requires that a federal court sitting in a case based on diversity jurisdiction
apply the law of the state except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The Erie Court reasoned that to allow a federal court to apply
federal law in cases brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction would encourage citizens not
otherwise eligible to avail themselves of a federal rule more favorable than the applicable state
law, Erie, 304 U.S. at 76. Moreover, the Erie Court asserted that federal supervision over state
legislative or judicial action infringed upon the autonomy and independence of the States. Erie,
304 U.S. at 78-79. Thus, the Erie doctrine sought to avoid imposition of federal common law
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doctrine requires that in a federal court action in which jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship, state law will govern the substantive aspects of
the suit and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will govern the procedural
aspects of the action.' 2 Disagreement exists, however, as to whether Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which governs standing in derivative actions,
is substantive or procedural for purposes of the Erie doctrine. 3 Finding
meritorious arguments for both positions, the Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure decided not to take a position on whether
rule 23.1 is procedural or substantive.' 4 The Advisory Committee further
indicated that the Supreme Court should not decide the procedural-substan-
tive question ex parte but, instead, should leave resolution of the question
to judicial decision in a litigated case.' 5 The Advisory Committee's decision
to forego resolution of the Erie issue with regard to standing has not yielded
a consistent result because courts have failed to reach a definitive conclusion
as to the nature of the standing requirements in rule 23.1 .16
Lower federal courts generally have interpreted federal rule 23.1 to be a
rule of procedure because the rule affects only a plaintiff's capacity to sue
on the states by requiring federal courts to apply the applicable state law in cases brought in
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. However, the Supreme
Court recognized that in claims involving federal questions, courts should render their decisions
in accordance with the applicable federal law in order to promote the uniformity of federal law
throughout the States. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. The Erie Court also asserted that when there existed
a conflict between an applicable state law and a federal rule that the federal rule governed in
matters of procedure and the state rule governed the substantive aspects of the action. Erie,
304 U.S. at 78.
The selection of the governing rule in diversity suits when a federal rule conflicts with an
applicable state law is often a threshhold question in derivative suits. Harbecht, The Contem-
poraneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suit, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1041, 1044-
45 (1978). The threshhold question focuses on whether the standing requirements in derivative
actions are procedural or substantive for purposes of determining the applicable law. See infra
notes 12-20 and accompanying text (analyzing Erie considerations in shareholder derivative
actions). See generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HAxv. L. REv. 693 (1974)
(discussing Erie doctrine); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. REv.
427 (1958) (analyzing Erie doctrine).
12. See MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.19-23.1-22 (discussing disagreement as to nature of
derivative suit). Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Erie, the necessity of distinguishing
substance from procedure has become extremely significant. Comment, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 724,
726 (1940). The Erie Court held that federal courts must apply the substantive law of the states.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. However, the Erie decision did not affect federal power over procedure
in the federal courts. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). Thus, the ability to distinguish
between substance and procedure is significant in determining whether a federal court should
apply state law or federal law.
13. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. See WuoHT & MILLER at § 1829, 354-67 (describing arguments
as to whether rule governing derivative actions is substantive or procedural).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 advisory committee note.
15. Id.; see MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-27 (discussing Advisory Committee's decision
not to resolve whether standing requirements in derivative actions are substantive or procedural).
PROCEDURAL).
16. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing conflict as to whether standing
requirements in derivative actions are substantive or procedural).
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and not the substantive cause of action.' 7 Courts holding that rule 23.1 is
substantive note that imposition of rule 23.1 may deny a plaintiff standing
in a federal court when the same plaintiff would have standing to bring the
action in state court.' 9 Thus, rule 23.1 bears directly on a plaintiff's substan-
tive rights because rule 23.1 may act as a complete bar to a derivative action
depending upon the court in which a plaintiff institutes suit."0 Other courts
have avoided entirely the Erie question in derivative actions by finding that
state law standing requirements are identical to the standing requirements of
17. Harbecht, supra note 11, at 1045; see Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333
F.2d 257, 265 (9th Cir. 1964) (defining rule 23.1 as rule of procedure); Harris v. Palm Springs
Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1964) (interpreting standing requirements in rule
23.1 to be procedural); MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-19 nn.10-11 (listing federal courts that define
rule 23.1 as rule of procedure). One commentator has suggested that the derivative action is a
procedural mechanism by which to enforce substantive rights. SULLIVAN, The Federal Courts as
an Effective Forum in Shareholders' Derivative Actions, 23 La. L. Rev. 580, 585 (1962). The
right to maintain a derivative action exists by statute or case law of the state governing the ac-
tivities of the corporation. Id. The means of enforcing the right are procedural and will be deter-
mined according to the federal rules governing federal courts if an action is brought in a federal
court. Id. Some courts that apply the federal rule in cases of inconsistent state law justify applica-
tion of the federal rule as reliance on a higher authority. Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90, 95
& n.3 (3d Cir. 1941); see Wright & Miller, supra note 1, at § 1829, 356-57 (citing Gallup v.
Caldwell). In Gallup v. Caldwell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit asserted
that there exists a strong presumption that the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, regarded rule 23.1 as a rule of procedure which should not affect the substan-
tive rights of litigants. Gallup, 120 F.2d at 95 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1941). Cf. Sullivan, supra, at 585-86
(derivative action is procedural device). But see infra notes 18-20 infra (courts that have found
federal rule 23.1 to be substantive).
18. See Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 657, 93 N.W. 1024, 1029 (1903)
(asserting that rule governing standing in derivative actions is substantive). In Home Fire
Insurance Co. v. Barber (Home Fire), the Nebraska court found that the purpose of federal
equity rule 94, a predecessor to federal rule 23.1, went far beyond the prevention of collusive
jurisdiction. 67 Neb. at____, 93 N.W. at 1029. The Home Fire court stated that the rule had
its foundation in a principle of equity. Id. The court explained that if the rule was no more
than jurisdictional, the rule would only prevent derivative suits when the plaintiff had the same
citizenship as the corporation. Id. The Home Fire court concluded, however, that the rule must
be more than jurisdictional because the rule applied whether the plaintiff could have brought
suit or not, thus evincing some purpose other than procedure. Id.; MoRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-
19 (listing cases finding that rules governing standing in derivative actions are substantive); Wright
& Miller, supra note 1, at § 1829, 355-56 (several considerations lend support to characterization
of rule 23.1 as substantive for Erie purposes).
19. WRIot & MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1829, 359. Professors Wright and Miller explain
that if rule 23.1 bars a plaintiff from bringing a derivative action in federal court that the
plaintiff would have been able to bring in state court absent the requirements of federal rule
23.1, then rule 23.1 infringes on state-created substantive rights. Id. at 358-59. Thus, to regard
rule 23.1 as procedural would undermine the policy objective of Erie, which sought to promote
identity of outcome between federal and local courts in the same state. Id. at 359; see also
MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-23 (rule 23.1 goes beyond procedure and involves substantive issue
if applied in federal and state courts with inconsistent results).
20. WRIGHT & MLER, supra note 1, at 359; MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-23.
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federal rule 23.1, so no conflict exists." Many state courts and legislatures
have actually adopted standing requirements similar to the requirements pro-
vided in rule 23.1 and, therefore, no problem arises in deciding whether to
apply state or federal law to determine a plaintiff's capacity to sue in those
jurisdictions.
22
Assuming that federal rule 23.1 controls, a plaintiff in a shareholder
derivative action must satisfy two requirements before a court will accord
the plaintiff standing to assert a claim on behalf of a corporation.2 First,
rule 23.1 requires that a plaintiff in a derivative action must have been a
shareholder at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains.24
Courts commonly refer to the requirement of stock ownership at the time
of the alleged wrong as the "contemporaneous ownership" requirement.
25
The contemporaneous ownership requirement prevents litigious persons from
buying stock after a corporate wrong for the sole purpose of bringing
derivative suits in an effort to extract money from the corporation.2 6 The
second requirement of rule 23.1 expressly requires that a plaintiff in a
derivative action must be a shareholder at the commencement of the litigation
21. See, e.g., Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1978) (in absence of
conflict between federal standing requirements and Florida law there exists no need to decide
whether rule 23.1 standing requirements are substantive or procedural); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120
F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1941) (deferring to federal law without resolving Erie problem of whether
rule 23.1 is substantive or procedural); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877,
882 (4th Cir.) (deferring to federal standing requirements as higher authority), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 695 (1940).
22. See Harbecht, supra note 11, at 1043 nn.7 & 10 (citing state cases and decisions
adopting provisions in federal rule 23.1); MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-17-23.1-19 n.6 (enumerating
states that have adopted standing requirements of federal rule 23. 1); see also 14 GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-123 (1982) (adopting federal rule 23.1 as law of state); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (West
1959) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-39.1 (1982) (same); Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1000
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that no conflict exists between Florida law and federal rule 23.1); Metal
Tech. Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co., 74 Or. App. 297, -, 703 P.2d 237, 242 (1985) (finding
that although no statutory rules exist in Oregon governing standing in derivative actions, general
principles of standing are consistent with federal rule 23.1); Lewis v. Anderson, 453 A.2d 474,
476 (1982) (finding that Delaware law is consistent with standing requirements in federal rules).
23. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.1 (defining standing requirements in derivative action); infra
note 26 and accompanying text (describing standing requirements of rule 23.1).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(1).
25. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881) (setting forth requirement of
ownership contemporaneous with wrong); Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1978)
(federal rule 23.1 contains contemporaneous ownership requirement); Harbecht, supra note 11,
at 1041 (crediting Hawes Court with initial enunciation of contemporaneous ownership require-
ment).
26. See Harbecht, supra note 11, at 1042 (contemporaneous ownership requirement is
means of discouraging purchase of shares primarily to instigate derivative litigation); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741-43 (1975) (contemporaneous stock ownership
is necessary to dissuade nuisance suits); see also Independent Investors Protective League v.
Time, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 259, 263, 406 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1980) (contemporaneous ownership
requirement originated to preclude manufacture of diversity jurisdiction but now requirement
seeks to inhibit speculation in litigation).
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and implicitly requires that a plaintiff retain stock ownership for the duration
of the suit. 27 The continuous ownership requirement seeks to ensure that the
real interest motivating a plaintiff in a derivative action is redress for a
wrong to the corporation and not merely receipt of a personal recovery. 28
Rule 23.1 does not, however, expressly set forth a "continuous ownership"
requirement. 29 Most state and federal courts have inferred the continuous
ownership requirement from the provision in rule 23.1 stating that a plaintiff
in a derivative action may not maintain the action unless the plaintiff
adequately represents the interests of other shareholders? 0 Courts have
asserted that the continuous ownership requirement is necessary because the
policy behind the standing rules for rule 23.1 requires that a plaintiff maintain
a proprietary interest in the corporation while the derivative action is
pending." Absent a proprietary interest in the corporation, courts explain,
27. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1 (listing standing requirements in shareholder derivative
actions); Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff in shareholder derivative
action must retain ownership of stock for duration of lawsuit); Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d
995, 999 (5th Cir. 1978) (stock ownership requirement continues during pendency of lawsuit).
But see Zauber v. Murray Savings Assn., 591 S.W.2d 932, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (court
must determine whether disposition of stock was voluntary or involuntary before dismissing
shareholder derivative action for lack of continuous ownership). See infra notes 102-110 and
accompanying text (discussing Zauber).
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (enumerating standing requirements for plaintiff in derivative
action).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. 1.
30. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing implied continuous ownership
requirement in federal rule 23.1); Schilling, 582 F.2d at 999 (language of rule 23.1 providing
that derivative action be brought by one or more shareholders implies requirement of continuous
ownership); Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (implying continuous
ownership requirement from provision abating action if plaintiff does not adequately represent
interests of shareholders similarly situated); Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 705 (W.Do
Pa. 1980) (rule 23.1 contains implied requirement of continuous stock ownership); Orenstein v.
Compusamp, 19 Fed. R. Serv.2d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (shareholder must retain stock
throughout derivative action even though rule 23.1 does not specifically require continuous
ownership); Harbecht, supra note I1, at 1043 (listing number of states that have adopted
standing requirements of federal rule 23.1); see MooIE, supra note 1, at 23.1-16-23.1-17 (same).
31. See Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979)
(nonshareholder or one who loses shareholder interest might not pursue vigorously shareholder
derivative action); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1970) (only
indirect benefit that plaintiff will receive as shareholder justifies standing in derivative action),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Metal Tech. Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co., 74 Or. App. 297,
703 P.2d 237, 242 (1985) (plaintiff must be shareholder throughout action to have incentive
to litigate fully and fairly); FLETCHER, supra note I, at § 5939, 13 (describing nature of derivative
action). In a shareholder derivative action, the shareholder is only a nominal plaintiff. Id. The
substantive claim belongs to the corporation. Id. When a plaintiff does not seek to assert a
right of action for the benefit of the corporation, the action is not derivative. Id. Although the
injury to the corporation may result in indirect injury to the shareholder, the injury to the
shareholder is regarded as insufficient to give rise to a direct cause of action by the shareholder.
Id. at 16, citing Burden v. Erskine, 264 Pa. 584, 586, 401 A.2d 369, 370 (1979). When a
shareholder loses possession of his stock interest in a corporation, he loses possession of that
which conferred upon him the standing to maintain a derivative action. FLETCHER, supra, at
13. Thus, courts have inferred a requirement in rule 23.1 that a shareholder maintain his interest
in the corporation while the derivative action is pending.
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the plaintiff has no stake in the outcome of the litigation and, therefore,
may not fairly and adequately defend the rights of the corporation or the
other shareholders whose interests the plaintiff purports to represent.
3 2
Furthermore, the only right that a plaintiff in a derivative suit possesses is a
secondary right derived from his status as a shareholder." Thus, if a plaintiff
does not retain shareholder status, the plaintiff does not retain the right to
pursue an action that derives from that status.
3 4
While courts generally hold that a derivative action will cease if the
plaintiff loses shareholder status during the course of the litigation, some
courts have begun to focus on the manner in which the plaintiff lost
shareholder status when deciding whether the court should permit the plain-
tiff to continue the litigation. 35 A small number of courts make a distinction
between voluntary and involuntary loss of shares, fashioning an exception
to the standing requirement of continuous ownership when the plaintiff
involuntarily has lost shares in the corporation on whose behalf the plaintiff
brought the action.3 6 Recently, a California state court, in Gaillard v.
Natomas Company,37 held that the continuous ownership requirement did
not deprive a plaintiff of standing to maintain a derivative action when the
plaintiff lost shareholder status by the involuntary divestment of stock
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining rationale behind implying
existence of continuous ownership requirement in rule 23.1).
33. MooRE, supra note 1, at 23.1-41. Professor Moore stated that rule 23.1 specifically
is limited to shareholder suits to enforce rights that are secondary in nature. Id. at 23.1-40. If
a plaintiff seeks to enforce primary rights, rule 23.1 is not applicable. Id. at 23.1-41. In Kauff-
man v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained
that, as a secondary right, a derivative action is limited to the plaintiff's need as a shareholder
to protect his interest as a shareholder. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 737
(3d Cir. 1970); see Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d at 767 (describing secon-
dary nature of shareholder derivative suits). The Seventh Circuit in Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco
Indus., Inc. explained that the rationale underlying derivative actions is that the shareholder has
reason to litigate vigorously the action because the shareholder will receive an indirect benefit
from a judgment favorable to the corporation. Portnoy, 607 F.2d at 767; see Lewis v. Chiles,
719 F.2d at 1047 (derivative action reflects shareholder's real interest in increasing value of plaintiff-
shareholder's stock).
34. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing secondary nature of plaintiff's
rights in shareholder derivative action).
35. See, e.g., Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(court must consider several factors before dismissing derivative action upon plaintiff's loss of
stock ownership); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 410,-, 219 Cal. Rptr. 74, 78
(1985) (holding that upon involuntary loss of stock ownership court should not necessarily abate
derivative action); Zauber v. Murray Savings Assn., 591 S.W.2d 932, 937-38 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (recognizing distinction between voluntary and involuntary disposition of shares in
corporation for purposes of standing in a derivative action); infra notes 37-86 and accompanying
text (discussing Natomas); infra notes 102-126 and accompanying text (discussing Arnett and
Zauber cases).
36. See infra notes 37-86 and 102-126 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
recognize distinction between voluntary and involuntary loss of shareholder status).




through a forced sale.38 The California state court decided the case under
the law of California. 39 The Natomas court acknowledged that no California
decisions concerning the continuous ownership requirement existed. 40 In
Natomas, though, a California state court of appeals held that imposing a
continuous ownership requirement was inequitable when a plaintiff in a
derivative action involuntarily lost shareholder status. 4'
In Natomas, the plaintiff, Gaillard, was a minimal stockholder in the
Natomas Company (Natomas). 42 In 1983, the board of directors of Natomas
entered into a merger agreement with Diamond Shamrock Corporation
(Diamond), which Natomas' shareholders subsequently approved. 43 Prior to
the effective date of the merger, Gaillard filed a derivative suit challenging
the "golden parachute" agreements" that the merger agreement provided
for certain officers and directors of Natomas.41 In the complaint, Gaillard
alleged that Natomas' directors breached a fiduciary duty by negotiating the
"golden parachute" agreements and recommending that the Natomas share-
holders approve the payments.4 Additionally, Gaillard alleged that she was
38. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. 74, 76.
39. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see CAL. CoR'. CODE § 800(b)(1) (1977 & Supp. 1985)
(California law governing derivative actions).
40. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The Natomas court noted that a New York court had
found that California law permitted the survival of corporate causes of action when suit was
pending at the time of merger. Id.; see Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 20 Fed. R.
Serv.2d 170, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (New York court interpreting California corporations law).
41. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 76. The plaintiff in Natomas lost shareholder status
through the involuntary divestment of stock upon completion of a merger. Id. at 75.
42. Id. at 75. The corporation involved in Natomas, the Natomas Company, was a
publicly held California corporation prior to the company's merger with New Diamond
Corporation in 1983. Id.
43. Id. at 75. New Diamond Corporation was formed in May 1983 for purposes of the
merger with the Natomas Company. Id. at 75 n.4. Diamond Shamrock Corporation subsequently
renamed itself New Diamond Corporation. Id. In May 1983, New Diamond Corporation
attempted a hostile takeover of Natomas. Id. In order to avoid a hostile takeover, the board
of directors of Natomas reached a merger agreement with New Diamond. Id. After negotiating
the merger agreement, the board of directors recommended that the Natomas shareholders
approve the merger. Id.
44. See id. The Natomas court described "golden parachutes" as payments guaranteed to
an officer of an acquired corporation to assure that the officer will receive financial compen-
sation in the event that the position of the officer changes upon completion of the merger. Id.
Golden parachute agreements, however, are not always exacted as part of a merger agreement.
See SHA.uc REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARAcHuTEs: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER 427
(R. Winter, M. Stumpf, G. Hawkins) (1984 Supp.) (describing golden parachute agreements).
Rather, corporations often execute golden parachute agreements in anticipation of events that
may have an adverse effect upon an officer's position. Id. at 426-27.
45. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 76. In Natomas, the plaintiff named as defendants in the
derivative suit Natomas Company, Diamond Shamrock Corporation, and American Company,
Ltd. Id. Gaillard also named the nineteen members of the Natomas board of directors as
defendants. Id.
46. Id. In the complaint in Natomas, the plaintiff alleged that the merger agreement
between Natomas and New Diamond Corporation provided a golden parachute payment of $15
million to five officers and directors of Natomas. Id. Plaintiff Gaillard further alleged that each
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a shareholder of record at the time of the transaction of which Gaillard
complained and at the time of the filing of the complaint.
47
When the Natomas/Diamond merger became effective, New Diamond
Corporation forced Gaillard and all other common stockholders to exchange
shares of Natomas stock for common stock in the New Diamond Corpora-
tion.4 Subsequently, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to Gail-
lard's complaint, finding that Gaillard no longer had standing to maintain
the derivative action because she was not a shareholder of Natomas.
49
Gaillard appealed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint to the First
District Court of Appeal in San Francisco.50 On appeal, the California
District Court of Appeal considered whether a shareholder who has satisfied
the contemporaneous ownership requirement under section 800(b)(1) of the
California Corporations Code5' has standing to maintain a derivative action
following the involuntary loss of shareholder status.12 The Natomas court
found that the California statute clearly stated that the plaintiff must be a
shareholder "at the time" of the alleged wrongdoing but contained no
express requirement of continuous stock ownership.53 In refusing to imply
of the directors had breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of Natomas by negotiating,
approving, and recommending the golden parachute payments. Id. at 75.
47. Id. at 75,
48. Id. Upon completion of the merger, New Diamond became the sole shareholder of
Natomas Company and the shareholders of Natomas held stock in New Diamond. Id. at 75-
76.
49. Id. at 76. The Nalomas court stated that the trial court had based the decision to
sustain defendants' demurrer on a Delaware case, Lewis v. Anderson. Id.; see Lewis v. Anderson,
453 A.2d 474, 480 (1982) (holding that plaintiff lost standing to maintain derivative suit when
plaintiff lost shareholder status as result of merger). The California District Court of Appeal
in Natomas rejected the trial court's reliance on the decision of the Delaware court in Anderson,
asserting that California affords a more liberal construction to the standing requirements in
derivative actions and, therefore, the Delaware decision did not bind a California court. Id.;
Anderson, 453 A.2d at 477-78 (interpreting standing requirements Delaware law imposes upon
plaintiff in derivative action).
50. Id. at 75.
51. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (1977 & Supp. 1986). Section 800(b)(1) of the California
Corporations Code provides, in part, that a plaintiff in a derivative action must allege in the
complaint that he was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which plaintiff complains
or that plaintiff's shares thereafter devolved upon plaintiff by operation of law from one who
was a shareholder at the time of the transaction. Id. Compare CAL. COPP. CODE § 800(b)(1)
(1977 & Supp. 1986) (California law governing standing in derivative actions contains no
provision requiring that plaintiff in derivative action adequately represent those whom he
purports to represent) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (federal rule governing standing in shareholder
derivative suits contains provision that plaintiff adequately defend interests of other shareholders
from which courts infer continuous ownership requirement).
52. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 76; see infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing
Natomas court's construction of § 800(b)(1) of California Corporation Code).
53. Id.; CAL. CoRP. CODE § 800(b)(l) (1977 & Supp. 1986). In interpreting the language
of § 800(b)(l), the Natomas court proceeded under the principle that the expression of certain
requirements in a statute necessarily precludes the inclusion of requirements not explicitly stated.
Id. Therefore, because § 800(b)(1) expressly required ownership "at the time" of the alleged
transaction, and made no provision for continuous stock ownership, the Natomas court asserted
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such a provision from the language of section 800(b)(1), the Natomas court
reasoned that a requirement that a plaintiff bringing a derivative action must
maintain shareholder status throughout the course of the litigation would
create a situation in which a shareholder could file a derivative action,
undertake extensive discovery and financial expense, and yet be precluded
from proceeding further because the shareholder involuntarily lost share-
holder status.14 The Natomas court stated that the legislature could not have
intended that a court dispose of an alleged wrong in such an inequitable
manner. 5
After concluding that imposition of the continuous ownership require-
ment would be inequitable, the Natomas court rejected as unpersuasive
defendants' arguments that jurisdictions outside of California require contin-
uous ownership of stock by a plaintiff in a derivative action.16 The court
found that the cases upon which defendants relied to support a continuous
ownership requirement were distinguishable from the Natomas case.17 Spe-
cifically, the Natomas court rejected defendants' reliance on Schilling v.
Belcher Oil Co.,"8 a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
that the court could not presume that continuous stock ownership was a requirement for
maintaining a derivative action. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 76. Upon further examination of legislative intent, the Natomas court concluded
that the predecessor to section 800 of the California Corporations Code, section 834, did not
contain a continuous ownership requirement. Id. at 77; see CA. CORP. CODE § 834 (1972),
repealed by CAt. CORP. CODE § 800(bXl) (1977 & Supp. 1986) (current California law governing
standing in shareholder derivative actions). The Natomas court found that section 834 of the
corporations code included a contemporaneous ownership requirement only to prevent individ-
uals from acquiring stock for the sole purpose of bringing a derivative suit. Id. The Natomas
court also found that the legislature patterned subsequent revisions to section 800 after the
Model Business Corporation Act, which contains no requirement of continuous stock ownership.
Id.; see ABA MODEL BUSINESS CORPORxION ACT § 49 (1975) (describing standing requirements
for plaintiffs in derivative actions). Moreover, the court in Natomas found that the legislative
changes to section 800 since 1975 were made to relax the contemporaneous ownership require-
ment. Id. The Natomas court concluded, therefore, that the legislature could not have intended
to include a continuous ownership requirement that would tend to restrict the capacity of a
plaintiff to maintain a derivative action. Id. The Natomas court also rejected defendant's
reliance on cases that the defendants contended required a restrictive interpretation of section
800 of the corporations code. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 77; see Mueller v. MacBan, 62 Cal.
App. 3d 258, 269, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222, 232 (1976) (case upon which defendants based argument
that code contained requirement of continuous stock ownership); Stockton v. Ortiz, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 183, 195, 120 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462 (1957) (same). The Natomas court found that the
cases defendants cited were inapposite to Natomas because in defendants' cited cases plaintiffs
were not shareholders at the time of the wrongful transaction. Id.
56. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir.
1978) (no conflict exists between Florida law and federal rule 23.1 in that both contain implied
continuous ownership requirement).
57. Id. at 78-79; see infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text (distinguishing Natomas
case from cases that defendants cited for support).
58. 582 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978). In Schilling v. Belcher, the plaintiff had brought a
derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty that was pending on appeal when the Coastal
States Gas Corporation purchased all of the outstanding stock of Belcher Oil Company. Id. at
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the Fifth Circuit.59 In Schilling, the Coastal States Gas Corporation purchased
all of the outstanding stock of Belcher Oil Company, including the plaintiff's
shares. 60 At the time of the purchase, a derivative action for breach of
fiduciary duty was pending on appeal. 61 The Fifth Circuit held that upon
disposition of stock in the Belcher Oil Company the plaintiff lost standing
to maintain the derivative action.62 The California District Court of Appeal
found that unlike the plaintiff in Natomas, who was forced to exchange
shares of Natomas because of the merger with Diamond, the plaintiff in the
Fifth Circuit case voluntarily had sold her stock pending appeal. 63 In addition,
the Natomas court distinguished the Fifth Circuit's opinion because the
plaintiff in Schilling instituted the derivative action in federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship while Natomas was a California state court
action 4 The Natomas court explained that no conflict existed between the
standing requirements of federal rule 23.1 and Florida law in Schilling and,
therefore, the Fifth Circuit had imposed the implied continuous ownership
requirement of rule 23. 1.65 Since the plaintiff in Natomas instituted suit in a
state court, the Erie doctrine did not require the Natomas court to apply
federal rule 23.1.66
999. The defendants in Schilling moved to dismiss the action on grounds that plaintiff had lost
standing to further prosecute a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's
claim. Id.
59. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see Schilling, 582 F.2d at 999 (case upon which
Natomas' defendants relied for proposition that jurisdictions other than California require
plaintiffs in derivative actions to maintain continuous stock ownership for duration of derivative
action).
60. Schilling, 582 F.2d at 999.
61. Id.
62. 582 F.2d at 1002.
63. Nalomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see Schilling, 582 F.2d at 999 (noting plaintiff
Schilling's disposition of stock pending appeal).
64. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see Schilling, 582 F.2d at 999 (noting that plaintiffs
brought claim in federal court based on diversity of citizenship); see supra notes 10-20 and
accompanying text (discussing federal-state conflict and Erie doctrine in context of standing
requirements in derivative actions).
65. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78. In Schilling, the court noted that the Florida law
governing shareholder derivative suits imposes upon a plaintiff in a derivative action the same
requirements as federal rule 23.1. Schilling, 582 F.2d 995, 1002; see Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr.
at 78 (noting that Schilling court held Florida law consonant with federal rule 23.1).
66. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78. Unlike the court in Natomas, most state courts apply
the standing requirements of federal rule 23.1 in shareholder derivative actions. See Bachrach
v. General Inv. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 966, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (continuous ownership of stock
is requirement under rule 23.1 and under New York case law); Vista Fund v. Garis, 277 N.W.2d
19, 23 & n.6 (Minn. 1979) (Minnesota statute is identical to federal rule 23.1 requiring continuous
ownership of stock); Gresov v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 40 Misc.2d 569, 571, 243 N.Y.S.2d
760, 763 (1963) (plaintiff in derivative action must be shareholder continuously from time of
alleged improper acts until after judgment); Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30 Misc.2d 429,




After rejecting defendants' reliance on the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Schilling for the proposition that jurisdictions outside of California require
continuous ownership of stock, the Natomas court also rejected defendants'
reliance on Niesz v. Gorsuch,67 a Ninth Circuit decision. 68 In Niesz, United
Security Life entered into a merger agreement with Provident Life Insurance
Company.6 9 Four months prior to completion of the merger, plaintiff, a
holder of United Security Life shares, had instituted a derivative suit for
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty unrelated to the merger. 70 In Niesz, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that upon
completion of the merger the plaintiff lost shareholder status and, therefore,
standing to maintain the derivative action because he no longer had a
proprietary interest in the corporation.7 ' The California Appellate Court
distinguished the Ninth Circuit case from the Natomas case on several
points.72 The Natomas court asserted that, unlike the merged corporation in
the Ninth Circuit case, Natomas did not cease to exist but became a subsidiary
of the acquiring corporation.7 Thus, while the cooperation of the surviving
corporation in maintaining the derivative action was feasible in Niesz because
the plaintiff in Niesz did not allege that the corporation engaged in any
wrongdoing, the cooperation of Diamond in maintaining a suit against itself
was unlikely.74 Therefore, to bar the derivative suit in Natomas would be to
deny relief to Gaillard and all similarly situated shareholders.75 The Natomas
67. 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961).
68. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d at 909 (case upon
which Natomas' defendants relied for proposition that when plaintiff loses shareholder status
upon completion of merger plaintiff also loses capacity to maintain derivative action).
69. Niesz, 295 F.2d at 911.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 295 F.2d at 913 (plaintiff lost capacity to maintain derivative action upon
completion of merger).
72. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78; see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (drawing
distinction between Natomas and Niesz decisions).
73. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78. In Niesz v. Gorsuch the corporation on whose behalf
plaintiff had brought a derivative action was acquired by merger and could no longer be a party
to the suit. Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1961). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the claim upon which the plaintiff had brought suit
then belonged to the acquiring corporation because it had gained all of the assets of the acquired
company. Niesz, 909 F.2d at 912. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff, having become a
shareholder of the acquiring corporation during the course of the merger, could not sue
derivatively for the acquiring corporation's benefit if the acquiring corporation refused to
intervene as plaintiff. Id. at 914.
74. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
75. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79; see Niesz, 295 F.2d at 913 (enumerating means
available for saving cause of action upon abatement of derivative action). The Ninth Circuit in
Niesz found two means by which the action could have continued after the merger and plaintiff
Gorsuch's loss of standing. Niesz, 295 F.2d at 913. First, the surviving corporation could have
intervened as party plaintiff. Id. The second alternative would have been for a shareholder of
the surviving corporation to intervene as party defendant and then later join the surviving
corporation. Id. The Natomas court found that the intervention of D.anond Shamrock as party
plaintiff, however, was unlikely. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79. The Natomas court explained
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court also recognized that the shareholder in the Ninth Circuit brought a
derivative action alleging that the directors of the corporation had breached
their fiduciary duty in actions unrelated to the merger while Gaillard based
the derivative action in Natomas entirely upon the acts of management in
connection with the merger. 76 The Natomas court explained that to bar the
maintenance of a derivative action challenging the wrongful acts of manage-
ment in concluding a merger because of the merger itself would lead to an
inequitable result.
77
In support of the decision to allow Gaillard to maintain the derivative
action, the Natomas court emphasized that a derivative suit is an equitable
action and, therefore, in interpreting section 800 of the California Corpo-
rations Code the court must take into account the fairness of requiring
continuous stock ownership2 8 The defendants in Natomas contended that an
alternative to the maintenance of the present lawsuit existed in the form of
a "double derivative" lawsuit. 79 The California Appellate Court defined a
double derivative lawsuit as an action brought by a shareholder of a parent
or holding company to enforce a cause of action in favor of the subsidiary
company. 80 The Natomas court explained that in a double derivative suit the
shareholder maintains a derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary when
the directors of both the parent and the subsidiary have refused to enforce
the action. 8' In rejecting the double derivative suit as an alternative in
that, in Niesz, the plaintiff had not alleged that the surviving corporation had participated in
the transactions of which plaintiff complained. Id. Thus, the Nalomas court recognized the
possibility of the surviving corporation in Niesz maintaining the action. Id. In contrast, the
Natomas court noted that the plaintiff in Natomas had named the surviving corporation,
Diamond, as a defendant allegedly responsible for the wrongful acts of which the plaintiff
complained. Id. Thus, the Natomas court found that little possibility existed for the intervention
of Diamond as a plaintiff to maintain the action against itself. Id.
76. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
77. Id. The Natomas court asserted thit to hold that the merger could have the effect of
destroying Gaillard's action would be equivalent to insulating management from liability by
virtue of the merger which management had arranged. Id.; see also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing
Co., 489 F.2d 579, 591 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974) (inequitable to bar suit questioning legality of
merger based on fact that merger results in loss of plaintiff-shareholder's interest in merged
corporation); Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1956) (when merger
achieved during action seeking to enjoin merger, court should preserve plaintiff-shareholder's
status pending outcome of injunction proceeding); Schlick v. Castle, 19 Fed. R. Serv.2d 642,
644 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (inequitable that former directors and surviving corporation are immune
from derivative action for fraud in merger because merged corporation and plaintiff's interest
therein no longer exist).
78. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79; see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Natomas court's equitable considerations); see supra note 55 and accompanying text
(indicating Natomas court's liberal interpretation of legislative intent behind section 800 of
California Corporation Code).
79. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80; see infra text accompanying notes 80-81 (defining
double derivative suit).
80. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80 n.7; see also WaGarr & MIHJR, supra note I, at §
1821, 294-95 (defining double derivative suit); MOORE, supra note I, at 23.1-70 (same).
81. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80 n.7.
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Natomas, the court stated that if Gaillard brought the action as a double
derivative suit, a court would dismiss the action as moot. 2 The Natomas
court explained that a double derivative suit in the Natomas case would
present a situation in which a corporation sued itself for the corporation's
own benefit because of acts the corporation performed.83 Moreover, the
Natomas court stated that the filing of a double derivative suit by Gaillard
would not have satisfied the contemporaneous ownership requirement of
section 800 of the Corporation's Code. 4 The court determined that Gaillard
was not a shareholder of Diamond at the time of the merger of which she
complained and, therefore, a court would not have granted Gaillard standing
to bring a double derivative action because Gaillard would not have satisfied
the contemporaneous ownership requirement. 85 Therefore, the court in Na-
tomas reversed the trial court's judgment of dismissal and concluded that
when a plaintiff in a derivative action involuntarily loses shareholder status
and abatement of the action leaves no feasible alternative remedy, the court
should allow the action to proceed in the interests of equity. 6 Several cases
support the Natomas court's decision providing that in a situation in which
a defendant may gain from allegedly wrongful conduct upon abatement of
plaintiff's derivative action, a court should allow the action to continue.8 7 In
82. Id. at 80.
83. Id.
84. Id. In addition to finding that the filing of a double derivative suit would not satisfy
the contemporaneous ownership requirement of section 800 of the California Corporation Code
because Gaillard was not a shareholder in Diamond at the time of the merger of which she
complained, the Natomas court also indicated that by filing a double derivative suit Gaillard
would be subject to the assertion of defenses to which she was not previously subject. Id.
Specifically, the Natomas court stated that if Gaillard filed a double derivative suit, she would
be subject to the equitable defense of unclean hands. Id.
85. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The "operation of law" exception to section 800 of
the California Corporations Code allows a plaintiff who acquires stock through a nonconsensual
transaction after the alleged wrong has occurred to proceed with a derivative action. CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 800(b)(I) (1977 & Supp. 1986); WRoIGr & Miu.ER, supra note 1, at § 1828, 348. For
example, the beneficiary of a will acquires shares through operation of law. See Phillips v.
Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (court permitted beneficiary of will to sue as
substitute plaintiff for redress of pre-acquisition wrongs). By operation of law implies the
absence of voluntary action and, therefore, courts generally do not regard mergers and
consequent transfers of stock to be "by operation of law." See United States v. Seattle-First
National Bank, 321 U.S. 583, 587-88 (1944) (when merger occurs through voluntary acts of
corporation, transfer of shares as consequence of merger not "by operation of law"); Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Anglim, 140 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1944) (transfer of stock to individual
shareholders in connection with merger not exempt from stamp tax that exempts transfer of
stock "by operation of law"); Weil v. United States, 115 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1940)
(transfer of bonds to trustees not "by operation of law" when consent of two-thirds of
certificate holders was necessary to effect passage of title). The "operation of law" exception
guards against the possibility that a plaintiff acquired shares for the purpose of instituting a
derivative lawsuit. WRIGsrH & MnLER, supra, at § 1828, 348-49.
86. Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
87. See Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D.2d 501, 504, 344 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (1973) (court
should allow derivative action to proceed when abatement of action would deprive shareholders
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Albert v. Salzman,"s a New York court noted concern over dismissing a
meritorious derivative action because the plaintiff lost shareholder status
when no feasible alternative existed. s9 In Albert, the court found that a
plaintiff who had sold stock obtained in a merger subsequent to initiation
of a derivative action could not proceed with the litigation.90 The New York
court, however, allowed another plaintiff to intervene and continue the
litigation. 9'
In addition to considering whether alternative means exist by which to
continue a derivative action, courts may take into account whether an
alternative action would be barred by the statute of limitations. 92 In Abrams
v. Occidental Petroleum Co.,93 the defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring a derivative action because plaintiffs were no longer
shareholders of Old Kern Corporation, having surrendered their shares in
Old Kern for shares in Tenneco upon completion of a merger agreement 4
The defendants in Abrams contended further that only New Kern, the
surviving corporation, or New Kern's shareholders could reinstitute the suit.95
The Abrams court, however, noted that if the court abated the existing
derivative action, future action instituted by New Kern would be subject to
dismissal based on the statute of limitations. 6 The New York court held that
allowing the entire action to fail would be grossly inequitable. 97 Thus, the
of feasible alternative remedy); Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d 170,
175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court considered whether statute of limitations would bar plaintiffs from
seeking redress for wrongs to corporation if court dismissed derivative action).
88. 41 A.D.2d 501, 344 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1973).
89. Albert, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court in Albert v. Salzman explained that the directors of Odell Corporation,
the corporation in which plaintiff Albert was a shareholder, conducted a series of private
negotiations with various officers of the Papercraft Corporation and as a result, the two
corporations entered into a merger agreement. Id. at 459-60. Plaintiff Albert brought a derivative
action alleging that the directors of Papercraft had gained illegal profits in connection with the
merger. Id. at 458. The defendants moved to dismiss Albert's complaint on the grounds that
Albert had sold his stock after Albert had instituted the suit. Id. The Albert court conceded
that Albert could no longer maintain the derivative action. Id. However, the court allowed the
intervention of Fine, another stockholder in Odell, to continue the action against the defendant
directors. Id. at 462. The Albert court reasoned that a court should not preclude a valid action
from proceeding because of the disqualification of the original plaintiff when another means is
available for continuing the action. Id. The Albert court stated that a court invariably grants
intervention for the purpose of survival of a derivative action. Id.
92. See Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d 170, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
93. 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. Abrams, 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d at 170.
95. Id. at 172.
96. Id. at 175.
97. Id. at 173, 175. The Abrams court based the decision to allow plaintiffs to maintain
the action after completion of a merger depriving plaintiffs of shareholder status on section 261
of title 8 of the Delaware Corporation Code. Id. at 173; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261 (1975).
The Abrams court indicated that section 261 provided, in part, that any action pending at the
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Abrams court allowed the plaintiffs to continue maintenance of the derivative
action despite plaintiffs' technical loss of shareholder status. 98
The decisions of the Natomas, Abrams, and Albert courts recognizing
an exception to the continuous ownership requirement in cases in which
abatement of a derivative action would be inequitable are contrary to the
great weight of established precedent. 99 Presently, a majority of courts hold
that upon any disposition of a plaintiffs stock a court must dismiss a
derivative action.' °° In recent years, however, several courts have recognized
a distinction between the voluntary and involuntary loss of stock as a
significant element in determining whether a plaintiff may proceed with a
derivative action upon loss of shareholder status.' 0' For instance, a Texas
court of appeals, in Zauber v. Murray Savings Association,'0 2 asserted that
when a plaintiff involuntarily loses shareholder status during the pendency
of a derivative suit, the plaintiff may proceed with the derivative action.'0 3
In Zauber, the defendant Board of Directors authorized a re-
verse stock split'0 4 which rendered void the plaintiff's shareholder
time of the merger by or against a corporation that is a party to the merger shall be prosecuted
as though the merger had not taken place. 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d at 173 n.2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 261 (1975).
98. Id. at 176.
99. See, e.g., Metal Teckniques Corp., 74 Or. App. 297,.___, 703 P.2d 237, 242 (1985)
(requiring ownership of stock for duration of shareholder derivative litigation); Lewis v.
Anderson, 453 A.2d 474, 476 (Del. 1982) (general principles of Delaware law require that
plaintiff maintain shareholder status during shareholder derivative litigation); Yanow v. Teal
Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263,----, 422 A.2d 311, 323 (1979) (plaintiff must maintain shareholder
status continuously until court renders judgment in derivative action); Polish Am. Pub. Co. of
Detroit v. Wojcik, 280 Mich. 466,___, 273 N.W. 771,774 (1937) (court may dismiss shareholder
derivative suit if plaintiff's stock passes from plaintiff during litigation); MOORE, supra note 1,
at 23.1-17-23.1-19 (listing state court decisions and statutes that have adopted federal rule 23.1,
which includes implied continuous ownership requirement); infra note 100 (federal courts upholding
federal rule 23.1 with implied requirement of continuous stock ownership).
100. See Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983) (equitable principles dictate
that plaintiff retain ownership during litigation); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir.
1983) (only continuous proprietary interest serves to justify standing in derivative suit); Portnoy
v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979) (shareholder who loses
shareholder interest during suit may lose incentive to prosecute and, therefore, may not
adequately defend the interests which he purports to represent); Overberger v. BT Financial
Corp., 106 F.R.D. 438, 441 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (plaintiff bringing derivative suit must remain
shareholder throughout pendency of litigation).
101. See Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (recognizing distinction between voluntary and
involuntary loss of shareholder status); Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1270,
1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff in derivative action retains standing if loss of shareholder status
is involuntary); Zauber v. Murray Savings Assn., 591 S.W.2d 932, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(recognizing possibility of maintenance of derivative suit if loss of shareholder status was
involuntary); infra notes 102-126 and accompanying text (discussing Arnett and Zauber).
102. 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
103. Id. at 932, 937-38.
104. Id. at 937. In a reverse stock split, a corporation generally reclassifies its shares at a
ratio above the largest minority holding and then eliminates the fractional shares. M. Lipton &
1986] 1029
1030 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
status."* The Zauber court explained that the state statute governing standing
requirements in derivative actions imposed requirements on a plaintiff in a de-
rivative action similar to the requirements set forth in rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including a requirement of continuous stock own-
ership.1°6 Nevertheless, the court in Zauber determined that rather than auto-
matically dismissing a derivative action upon loss of plaintiffs shareholder
status, a court should inquire into the cause of the deprivation of plaintiff's
status.'°7 In Zauber, the court acknowledged that when a plaintiff voluntarily
disposes of stock during the course of the litigation, the plaintiff loses stand-
ing to maintain the action because the plaintiff's interests are no longer con-
sistent with the interests of the corporation.2' However, the Zauber court
found that when the plaintiff loses shareholder status involuntarily through
actions of corporate defendants, a court must determine whether the defend-
ants acted with a valid business purpose or merely to defeat plaintiff's stand-
ing to maintain the suit.109 The Zauber court stated that if a court of equity
E. Steinberger, TAKEOVERS & FREzaouTs (1986), § 9.03[3] at 9-13. A reverse stock split may
require a charter amendment to reduce the number of authorized and outstanding shares.
Dykstra, The Reverse Stock Split-That Other Means of Going Private, 53 Cin. KENT L. REa.
1, 3 (1976) (explaining reverse stock splits and consequences thereof); Lawson, Reverse Stock
Splits: The Fiduciary's Obligations Under State Law, 63 CAL. L. RE. 1226, 1227 (1976) (same).
Commentators explain that by authorizing a reverse stock split, a corporation can reduce the
number of shares so that the minority shareholders have less than one share. Dykstra, supra,
at 3; Lawson, supra, at 1227. The corporation then purchases the fractional shares and deprives
the minority shhreholders of continuing ownership. Dykstra, supra, at 3.
105. Zauber, 591 S.W.2d at 934. In Zauber, the stockholders held a meeting at which the
stockholders authorized a reverse stock split by which one share of stock was to replace ten
shares. Id. The plaintiff in Zauber, Zauber, was not present at the shareholders' meeting at
which the shareholders authorized the reverse stock split. Id. The amended by-laws of the
corporation provided that cash would be exchanged for fractional shares. Id. At the time of
the alleged wrongful transaction, Murray Financial Corporation held 99,972 shares of the stock
of Murray Savings & Loan, plaintiff Zauber held 6 shares, and another individual owned 22
shares. Id. After Zauber filed suit, Murray Financial purchased the 22 shares. Id. Upon
completion of the reverse stock split, plaintiff would retain less than one share of stock which
would effectively eliminate the plaintiff's shareholder status. Id. The plaintiff in Zauber refused
to accept the cash payment. Id.
106. Id. at 936. The Zauber court noted that Article 5.14(B) of the Texas Business
Corporation Act establishes standing requirements for derivative suits similar to the requirements
of federal rule 23.1. Id.; see FED. R. Cwr. P. 23.1 (federal rule governing derivative suits); 3A
TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14(B) (Vernon 1980) (Texas law governing standing in shareholder
derivative actions).
107. Zauber, 591 S.W.2d at 936-37.
108. Id. at 937.
109. Id. at 936-37. The Zauber court cited an Illinois case, Teschner v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., to support the proposition that improper conduct on the part of corporate
management may render the consequences of the conduct void. Id. at 938; see Teschner v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 II1. 452, 458-59, 322 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1974) (court upheld reverse
stock split when plaintiff failed to show improper purpose on part of defendant corporation).
The Illinois court in Teschner stated that corporate action generally may terminate the interests
of minority stockholders. 59 Ill.2d at 456. The Teschner court cautioned, however, that if
improper conduct underlies a corporate action, a court may declare it invalid. Id. at 457. In
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finds that no valid business purpose existed, the court must consider the loss
of plaintiff's shareholder status insignificant and allow plaintiff to proceed
with the derivative action." '0
While the Zauber court focused on whether the defendants acted with a
valid business purpose in causing a plaintiff to lose shareholder status, a
New York court examining the voluntary-involuntary distinction for standing
requirements in shareholder derivative suits concluded that three elements
must exist before a court allows a plaintiff to proceed with a derivative
action when the plaintiff loses shareholder status during the pendency of the
litigation."' In Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 1 2 plaintiffs brought a
derivative action in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York alleging that the majority shareholders of Camsco, Incorporated
breached a fiduciary duty in consummating a merger that plaintiffs claimed
Teschner, the court upheld a reverse stock split that resulted in the loss of plaintiff's shareholder
status because the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of an improper purpose on the part of
the defendants for the reverse stock split. Id. at 459.
While the controlling shareholders of a corporation should not be hampered in managing
the corporation, neither should minority shareholders be forced to relinquish interest in a
corporation unless the proposed action has a genuine business purpose beyond the desire to
freeze out minority shareholders. Comment, Recent Developments in the Law of Corporate
Freezeouts, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1252, 1256 (1973). Many states now allow shareholders
to sue in equity to enjoin corporate action when bad faith or fraud can be shown. Id. at 1256.
Ascertaining the validity of the majority's purpose in conducting corporate affairs is very
complex. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HLv.
L. REv. 1189, 1193 (1963). Courts seeking to determine the validity of corporate conduct weigh
the sufficiency of the business reason for the corporate action of which a minority shareholder
complains against the harm the corporate action will cause the minority shareholder. Close
Corporations-Bad Faith of Majority, 35 N.C. L. REv. 271, 273 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Close Corporations]. For instance, a court may find that the majority lacked a valid business
purpose if a plaintiff shows that a transaction caused a substantial gain to majority shareholders
and a concomitant loss to the minority shareholders without advantage to the corporation.
Close Corporations, supra, at 273; see Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340,-----, 67 S.E.2d
350, 354 (1951) (court held that facts alleged were sufficient to show that issuance of stock that
caused substantial decrease in value of plaintiff's stock was unnecessary). Courts also have
questioned the motive of the majority when a transaction that resulted in a gain to the
corporation could have been achieved by means less harmful to the minority shareholders. Close
Corporations, supra, at 273; see Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 240 (Del.
1953) (majority could have been more fair to minority without damaging interests of corporation
by purchasing shares of minority at a higher price); Vorenberg, supra, at 1194-1204 (analyzing
cases in which validity of business purpose is at issue).
110. Zauber, 591 S.W.2d at 938. The Zauber court explained that to allow the involuntary
disposition of plaintiff's stock to preclude maintenance of a derivative action without inquiring
as to whether corporate management acted with a valid business purpose would allow intentional
destruction of plaintiff's shareholder status for the sole purpose of defeating plaintiff's standing
to maintain a suit. Id. at 937-38.
111. See Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(describing elements court should consider when determining whether to abate derivative action
upon plaintiff's loss of shareholder status).
112. 566 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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was not in the best interests of the corporation." 3 As a remedy, the plaintiffs
in Arnett sought, inter alia, rescission of the merger." 4 The defendants in
Arnett challenged plaintiffs' standing to bring a derivative action because
plaintiffs would lose shareholder status after the merger.' 5 In analyzing the
case, the district court first noted that federal law applied in Arnett because
the plaintiffs sued derivatively under federal antitrust law." 6 The Arnett
court explained that a shareholder's capacity to vindicate a federally created
corporate right is a right conferred solely by federal law and that Congress
could not have intended that enforcement of federal law vary from state to
state because of differing state policies regarding shareholder derivative
actions.' 7 The Arnett court reasoned, therefore, that federal rule 23.1
governed plaintiffs' capacity to maintain a derivative action." 8 After con-
cluding that rule 23.1 was applicable, the district court in Arnett reasoned
that denying plaintiffs standing to maintain a derivative action would allow
an inequitable situation to exist in which corporate management could engage
in wrongful conduct, so long as the wrongful conduct caused shareholders
to lose shareholder status." 9 Thus, the district court in Arnett denoted three
113. Arnett, 566 F. Supp. at 1271. The plaintiffs in Arnett v. Gerber, Scientific Inc. were
minority shareholders in Camsco, Inc., a corporation whose majority shareholder was Sulzer
Brothers Ltd. Id. at 1271. Three named individual defendants were employees of Sulzer and
members of Camsco's board of directors. Id. Corporate defendants included Gerber Scientific,
Inc. (GSI), a publicly-owned holding company, and Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. (GGT),
a wholly-owned subsidiary of GSI. Id. As part of a plan of GSI and GGT to drive Camsco out
of business in order to monopolize the market, GGT purchased Sulzer's interest in Camsco. Id.
Subsequently, Camsco merged with Newco. Id. Sulzer consummated the sale of its interest to
GGT despite repeated assurances to the board of directors of Camsco that Sulzer would not
sell its share of Camsco to GGT. Id. Plaintiffs and other minority shareholders were to receive
cash upon surrender of their stock certificates in Camsco. Id. Before surrendering their stock
certificates, plaintiffs brought a derivative action on behalf of Camsco. Id.
114. Id. The plaintiffs in Arnett sought money damages and divestiture of Camsco by the
acquiring corporation, GGT. Id. Alternatively, the Arnett plaintiffs sought rescission of the
merger. Id.
115. Id. at 1271.
116. Id. at 1278; see Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (prohibiting acquisition by
corporation of whole or part of assets of another corporation when effect may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create monopoly); Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 10(b)
(1982) (preventing manipulative or deceptive practices in connection with purchase or sale of
securities); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (prohibiting monopolies in restraint of trade or
commerce); see Orenstein v. Compusamp, 19 Fed. R. Serv.2d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (federal
law controls whether plaintiff has standing to bring derivative action under rule 23.1 when
plaintiff's cause of action is for violation of federal laws).
117. 566 F. Supp. at 1272. The Arnett court noted that state standing rules apply to
derivative actions involving state substantive claims. Id. The court further noted, however, that
when a plaintiff in a derivative action brings a claim under federal law, federal law determines
plaintiff's standing to assert the claim. Id. The court indicated that the plaintiffs in Arnett
brought a derivative action under federal antitrust law and, therefore, the court should not
apply New York state law to determine whether plaintiffs had standing to maintain the derivative
action. Id.
118. Id. at 1272.
119. Id. at 1273.
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elements the presence of which would accord a plaintiff standing to maintain
a derivative action even though the plaintiff was no longer a shareholder.' 20
The Arnett court stated that the first element was whether the plaintiff
involuntarily lost stock ownership.' 2' The second element according to the
Arnett court's formulation was whether the plaintiff's loss of stock ownership
was related to the defendant's allegedly wrongful acts. '22 The district court
in Arnett articulated that the final element was whether the remedy sought
would result in plaintiff regaining his shareholder status.' 23 The Arnett court
asserted that, when a court finds the three elements present, a court may
decide that allowing plaintiffs standing to proceed with the litigation does
not conflict with the continuous ownership requirement of rule 23.1.24 The
Arnett court stated that the purpose behind the implied continuous ownership
requirement in rule 23.1 was to ensure that the plaintiff had an incentive to
vigorously pursue the claim on behalf of the corporation. 12S The Arnett court
emphasized that its decision did not undermine the purpose behind rule 23.1
because when the corporate injury and the shareholder's right to rescission
arise out of the same transaction, the interests of the plaintiff are consistent
with the interests of the corporation, which ensures that the plaintiff ade-
quately will defend the corporation that the plaintiff purports to represent.
26
Courts increasingly have begun to recognize that, in the interests of
equity, courts must sometimes fashion exceptions to the continuous owner-
ship requirement. 27 Even state courts that strictly adhere to the implied
120. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 121-123 (describing three elements courts should
consider when determining whether to allow derivative action to proceed). The Arnett court
expressed no opinion as to whether a plaintiff could maintain a derivative action if fewer than
three of the enumerated elements were present. Arnett, 566 F. Supp. at 1273.
121. Arnett, 566 F. Supp. at 1273. The Arnett court explained that to allow a derivative
action to be discontinued when a plaintiff involuntarily disposed of shares in a corporation
would be tantamount to insulating corporate management from liability for wrongful acts when
the wrongful acts deprived a shareholder of his stock. Id. The court in Arnett reasoned that it
would be unconscionable to deprive a shareholder of standing to maintain an action before the
shareholder can complain of management's wrongful conduct. Id.
122. Id. at 1273.
123. Id. at 1273. The rationale behind the third of the Arnett court's three elements,
restoration of shareholder status, is presumably that a plaintiff who stands to regain shareholder
status upon a favorable judgment has the requisite interest to prosecute the action zealously in
accord with the policy behind the continuous ownership requirement. Id.
124. Arnett, 566 F. Supp. at 1273.
125. Id.
126. Id. The Arnett court reasoned that if the plaintiffs successfully obtained a favorable
judgment, the court would restore plaintiffs' shareholder status and require defendants to pay
damages to the corporation. Id. Therefore, the Arnett court concluded that refusing to dismiss
the action did not violate the policy of rule 23.1 because plaintiffs had an incentive to prosecute
the action vigorously. Id.; see also Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 706 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(when shareholder's right to rescission arose out of alleged wrongdoing for which plaintiff
brought derivative action, plaintiff's right to rescission sufficient to confer standing).
127. See Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (recognizing exception to continuous ownership
requirement when plaintiff involuntarily lost shareholder status through forced sale upon
merger); Albert, N.Y.S.2d at 461 (allowing derivative action to proceed despite loss of share-
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continuous ownership requirement of federal rule 23.1 have conceded that
when corporate management performs acts for the sole purpose of depriving
a plaintiff shareholder of standing to maintain an action, a court of equity
must protect the shareholders by allowing the action to continue. 128 Allowing
a plaintiff-shareholder to continue a derivative action in cases when corporate
defendants wrongfully deprive a plaintiff of shareholder status does not
contravene the policy underlying the continuous ownership requirement.
29
Requiring continuous stock ownership guarantees that a plaintiff in a deriv-
ative action will have a proprietary interest in the corporation that will
motivate a plaintiff to engage in a zealous prosecution.3 0 When a judgment
holder status when no feasible alternative remedy existed); Abrams, 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d at 175
(plaintiff may maintain derivative action in spite of loss of stock ownership when statute of
limitations barred subsequent litigation).
128. See Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. Sup. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 921 (1971). In Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that, in
extreme cases, equitable circumstances may justify permitting a plaintiff to maintain a pending
derivative action despite the loss of shareholder status. Id. The Bokat court indicated that if a
proposed merger was used to cover up wrongful acts of management, then a court of equity
must protect the shareholders and permit the action to continue, Id.; see also Independent
Investors Protective League v. Time, Inc., 50 N.Y.S.2d 259, 263-64, 406 N.E.2d 486, 487 (1980)
(court invoked equitable powers to allow shareholders to maintain derivative action after
dissolution of corporation because management breached fiduciary duty in connection with
takeover).
129. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing policies underlying continuous
ownership requirement). The policy underlying the continuous ownership requirement seeks to
ensure an adequate and vigorous representation of the corporation's right of action. See Gresov
v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 40 Misc.2d 569, 571, 243 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763 (1963) (explaining
logic behind continuous ownlership requirement). The Gresov court explained that the plaintiff
in a derivative action is suing as the representative of shareholders similarly situated. 1d. Once
a plaintiff in a derivative action loses his shareholder status he may lose his interest in the
corporation. Id. A plaintiff may not prosecute an action as the representative of a class to
which he does not belong and with whom he has no consistent interests. Id.; see also Arnett v.
Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that minority
shareholderes frozen out by merger may retain standing without violating continuous ownership
requirement); Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 706 (1980) (allowing action seeking
rescission of merger to continue despite loss of shareholder status did not undermine policy
behind standing requirements), Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22 (Del. 1982) (equity interest
in corporation remained the same and denial of standing would not advance stated purpose of rule
when plaintiff's disposition of stock was involuntary); Independent Investors Protective League
v. Time, Inc., 406 NE.2d 486, 488 (1980) (shareholder of allegedly wrongfully dissolved
corporation had sufficient interest to satisfy spirit of rule 23.1).
130. See Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979)
(shareholder who loses shareholder interest during suit may lose incentive to prosecute action).
The Seventh Circuit in Portnoy stated that the rationale underlying derivative actions is that
the shareholder has reason to litigate vigorously the action because the shareholder will receive
an indirect benefit from a judgment favorable to the corporation on whose behalf the plaintiff
brings the claim. Id. The Portnoy court explained that financial benefit to a corporation
ultimately benefits the shareholders of the corporation and thus, a judgment favorable to the
corporation also is favorable to the stockholders. Id.; see Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047




in favor of the corporation could result in reinstatement of shareholder
status, however, reinstatement provides an adequate incentive for a plaintiff
to litigate zealously.' Moreover, a derivative suit is equitable in nature and
courts should perform more than a mere technical application of the contin-
uous ownership requirement before abating a derivative action. '2
Since a derivative action is equitable in nature, a court must take into
account the particular circumstances in each case when determining whether
a court should preclude a plaintiff who loses shareholder status during the
course of the litigation from proceeding with the action.'33 The Natomas,
Arnett, Zauber, Abrams, and Albert courts have recognized that equitable
considerations may outweigh a per se requirement of continuous stock
ownership in every instance. 3 4 The absence of a present proprietary interest
in a corporation does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff has no stake in
the outcome of the litigation such that a plaintiff cannot adequately prosecute
the corporation's right of action and represent the interest of similarly
situated shareholders. 3s Thus, when a plaintiff loses shareholder status during
the pendency of the litigation, courts should allow equity to be a factor in
determining whether to abate a derivative action rather than mechanically
applying the continuous ownership requirement which could result in an
inequitable denial of standing.
LISA M. MnANI
131. See Arnett, 566 F. Supp. at 1273 (plaintiff who stands to regain shareholder status
upon favorable judgment has adequate incentive to litigate vigorously); see supra notes 129-130
and accompanying text (policy behind continuous ownership requirement seeks to ensure
adequate representation of shareholders' interests).
132. See Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (mechanical application of federal rule 23.1 could
create inequitable result of permitting defendant's wrongful conduct to go unredressed); Bokat
v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. Sup. 1970) (equity may allow maintenance of
derivative action despite plaintiff's loss of shareholder status); Willcox v. Stern, 273 N.Y.S.2d
38, 45, 219 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1966) (equitable considerations may lead to conclusion that
shareholders of merged corporation do not always lose capacity to sue derivatively).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 121-123 (describing factors court should
consider when determining standing of plaintiff upon plaintiff's loss of stock).
134. See Arnett, 566 F. Supp. at 1273 (noting distinction between voluntary and involuntary
loss of shareholder status); Abrams, 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d at 175 (plaintiff may maintain derivative
action in spite of loss of stock when statute of limitations bars subsequent reinstitution of suit);
Zauber, 591 S.W.2d at 937-38 (recognizing distinction between voluntary and involuntary loss
of plaintiff's shares during derivative action); Natomas, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (holding involuntary
loss of shareholder status may not be cause to abate derivative action); Albert, 344 N.Y.S.2d
at 461 (allowing derivative action to proceed despite loss of shareholder status when no feasible
alternative remedy existed).
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (loss of shareholder status does not
necessitate abatement of action when failure to abate would not undermine purpose of
continuous ownership requirement).
1986] 1035

